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Abstract. The Weak Completion Semantics (WCS) is a computational
cognitive theory that has shown to be successful in modeling episodes
of human reasoning. As the WCS is a recently developed logic program-
ming approach, this paper investigates the correspondence of the WCS
with respect to the well-established Answer Set Semantics (ASP). The
underlying three-valued logic of both semantics is different and their
models are evaluated with respect to different program transformations.
We first illustrate these differences by the formal representation of some
examples of a well-known psychological experiment, the suppression task.
After that, we will provide a translation from logic programs understood
under the WCS into logic programs understood under the ASP. In partic-
ular, we will show that logic programs under the WCS can be represented
as logic programs under the ASP by means of a definition completion,
where all defined atoms in a program must be false when their definitions
are false.
Keywords: Answer Set Programming, Weak Completion Semantics,
Strong Negation, Human Reasoning
1 Introduction
The Weak Completion Semantics (WCS), originally presented in [9], has been
suggested as a computational cognitive theory, and demonstrated to be adequate
for modeling various episodes of human reasoning summarized in [8]. Consider
a well-known psychological experiment, the suppression task [2], which showed
that participants’ answer systematically diverged from classical logic correct an-
swers. Participants were asked to derive conclusions given variations of a set of
premises. The first group was given the following two premises:1
If she has an essay to finish, then she will study late in the library. (e ℓ)
She does not have an essay to finish. (not e)
1 The participants received only the natural language sentences, not the abbreviations.
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Then, they were asked what necessarily follows assuming that the above premises
were true and given three possible answer from where they could choose:
She will study late in the library. (ℓ)
She will not study late in the library. (not ℓ)
She may or may not study late in the library. (ℓ or not ℓ)
54% of the participants answered that She will not study late in the library. The
second group received, additionally to (e ℓ) and (not e), the following premise:
If she has a textbook to read, then she will study late in the library. (t ℓ)
Now, only 4% of the participants answered that She will not study late in the
library. With these results, Byrne showed that humans seem to reason non-
monotonically, i.e. they suppressed previously drawn conclusions. The above ex-
amples demonstrates that humans do not always apply the close world assump-
tion in their inferences. In particular, if they are made aware of alternatives,
they might rather apply the open world assumption. Stenning and van Lam-
balgen [15] suggested a formal representation of these premises by licenses for
inferences. For the first group, the following logic program rules were suggested:
ℓ← e ∧ not ab1 e← ⊥ ab1 ← ⊥ (1)
ab1 is an abnormality predicate. ab1 ← ⊥ and e← ⊥ are (negative) assumptions
which assume e and ab1 being false.
2 In the designated model under the WCS [9],
which is the least model of the weak completion of that program under the three-
valued  Lukasiewicz logic [11], e, ℓ and ab1 are false. On the other hand, the logic
program rules for the second group was suggested to be as follows:
ℓ← e ∧ not ab1 ℓ← t ∧ not ab2 e← ⊥ ab1 ← ⊥ ab2 ← ⊥ (2)
Here, in the designated model under the WCS, e, ab1 and ab2 are false, and ℓ
and t unknown. The differences between both models, where in the first case ℓ is
false, and in the second case ℓ is unknown, seems to represent well the suppression
effect occurring in the second group: In the first group, 46% concluded that She
will not study late in the library, whereas in the second group, only 4% concluded
that She will not study late in the library. The overall results of all the twelve
cases of the suppression tasks seem to be adequately modeled under the WCS [3].
In this paper we will investigate how the above two cases of the suppression
task can be modeled under the Answer Set Semantics [7] (ASP), in particular how
both semantics correspond to each other. For this purpose, we first introduce the
notions and notation used throughout the paper and the underlying three-valued
logics. Section 3 introduces ASP and WCS and shows some intermediate results.
The main result is presented in Section 4, where the formal correspondence
between both semantics is shown, and the above two cases will be discussed
again.
2 The rules will be understood under their weak completion.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present the general notation and terminology that will be used
throughout the paper together with the semantics for classical logic with strong
negation [16] and three-valued  Lukasiewicz logic [11]. In the sequel, definitions
are specified in the running text, except if we intend to emphasize them.
2.1 Syntax
We assume a fixed non-empty and (possibly infinite) set of ground atoms, de-
noted by At. The set of (strongly) negated atoms for the atoms in S ⊆ At, is
defined as ¬S def= {¬A | A ∈ S}. A literal L is either an atom or its (strong)
negation, that is L ∈ (At ∪ ¬At). Given a set of atoms At, a formula is defined
according to the following grammar:
ϕ ::= A | ⊥ | ⊤ | U | ϕ ◦ ψ | ¬ϕ | notϕ
⊤, ⊥ and U denote the truth constants true, false and unknown, respectively.
The connective “not ” stands for weak or default negation, whereas “¬” stands for
strong negation. The connectives “←CL”, “← L” and “←” stand for classical (or
material) implication,  Lukasiewicz implication and logic programming implica-
tion, respectively. The logic programming implication sign← is purely syntactic
and, different to←CL and← L, will not be assigned a fixed underlying semantics.
We will study two different logic programming semantics and depending on the
semantics in consideration, the meaning for ← is then specified accordingly. We
use ↔X as an abbreviation defined by
ϕ↔X ψ
def= (ϕ←X ψ) ∧ (ψ ←X ϕ), (3)
where X ∈ {C,  L}. A formula ϕ is regular if its only occurrences of implications
strong negation ¬ only occurs in front of atoms. A formula ϕ is called implication-
free if there are no occurrences of the implication connectives ←CL, ← L or ←,
i.e. its set of connectives is {∧,∨,¬, not }. A formula ϕ is called basic if it is
implication-free, and in addiction, it has no occurrences of weak negation, i.e.
its only connective are {∧,∨,¬}. Basic formulas are implication-free formulas,
but not vice versa. Note that, in general, regular formulas that are implication-
free need not to be basic nor basic formulas need to be regular.
Example 1. Consider the following three formulas:
ϕ0 = (¬(¬p ∧ q) ∨ not r) ϕ1 = (¬(¬p ∧ q)) ϕ2 = (not (¬p ∧ q))
ϕ0, ϕ1 and ϕ2 are implication-free formulas, but ϕ0 is neither basic nor regular.
ϕ1 is basic, but not regular, whereas ϕ2 is regular but not basic.
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F notF
⊤ ⊥
U ⊤
⊥ ⊤
∧ ⊤ U ⊥
⊤ ⊤ U ⊥
U U U ⊥
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
←CL ⊤ U ⊥
⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
U U ⊤ ⊤
⊥ ⊥ ⊤ ⊤
↔CL ⊤ U ⊥
⊤ ⊤ U ⊥
U U ⊤ ⊤
⊥ ⊥ ⊤ ⊤
F ¬F
⊤ ⊥
U U
⊥ ⊤
∨ ⊤ U ⊥
⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
U ⊤ U U
⊥ ⊤ U ⊥
← L ⊤ U ⊥
⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
U U ⊤ ⊤
⊥ ⊥ U ⊤
↔ L ⊤ U ⊥
⊤ ⊤ U ⊥
U U ⊤ U
⊥ ⊥ U ⊤
Table 1. Truth tables for three-valued  Lukasiewicz logic {¬,∧,∨,← L,↔ L}, and Clas-
sical Logic extended with strong negation {¬, not ,∧,∨,←CL,↔CL}.
2.2 Three-valued Semantics
A (three-valued) interpretation I : At −→ {⊤,⊥,U} is a function mapping each
atom to a truth constant. We introduce now two different alternative representa-
tions of interpretations that are equivalent and common in the literature: An in-
terpretation I can be represented as a pair of set of atoms, I = 〈I⊤, I⊥〉 such that
I⊤ ∩ I⊥ = ∅ where the correspondence is given as follows: I⊤ = {A | I(A) = ⊤}
and I⊥ = {A | I(A) = ⊥}. Note that A /∈ (I⊤ ∪ I⊥) holds iff I(A) = U. Alterna-
tively, I can be represented as a set of literals I⊤∪¬I⊥. The first representation
is usual in the context of the WCS while the second is usual in the context of
Answer Set Programming (ASP) [1]. We will use them interchangeably.
Three-valued interpretations can be ordered either by knowledge or by truth:
Given two interpretations I = 〈I⊤, I⊥〉 and J = 〈J⊤, J⊥〉, we say that I contains
less knowledge than J , in symbols I ⊆k J , iff I⊤ ⊆ J⊤ and I⊥ ⊆ J⊥ iff (I⊤ ∪
¬I⊥) ⊆ (J⊤∪¬J⊥). In other words, I and J agree in all atoms which are known
in I, but I can have more unknown atoms. On the other hand, when the truth
order is applied, i.e. ⊥ ≤ U ≤ ⊤, then, given two interpretations I = 〈I⊤, I⊥〉
and J = 〈J⊤, J⊥〉, we say that I contains less truth than J , in symbols I ⊆t J , iff
I⊤ ⊆ J⊤ and J⊥ ⊆ I⊥ iff (I⊤ ∪ ¬J⊥) ⊆ (J⊤ ∪ ¬I⊥). As we are only interested
in the knowledge ordering, we will omit the subscript k in the following, and
simply write I ⊆ J when we refer to I ⊆k J .
In this paper, we will consider two different three-valued logics, so we in-
troduce some general definitions parametrized by the logic. Given a (three-
valued) logic L, a three-valued interpretation I satisfies a formula ϕ, in symbols
I |=L ϕ, iff I evaluates ϕ as true, that is I(ϕ) = ⊤. Furthermore, I is called
a (three-valued) model of a theory Γ (where Γ is a set of formulas) under L,
denoted by I |=L Γ , iff I |=L ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ . I is a ⊆-minimal model of Γ iff
for no other model J of Γ , J ⊂ I (ordered according to the knowledge). I is
the ⊆-least model of Γ iff it is the unique minimal model of Γ . A formula ϕ is
valid in L, denoted by |=L ϕ, iff I |=L ϕ for every interpretation I. Furthermore,
we write Γ |=L ϕ iff I |=L Γ implies I |=L ϕ for every interpretation I. For
theories Γ and Γ ′, we write Γ ≡L Γ ′ iff every interpretation I satisfies: I |=L Γ
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iff I |=L Γ ′. We will omit the brackets { and }, in case ≡L is applied to formulas,
i.e. we write ϕ ≡L ϕ′ iff {ϕ} ≡L {ϕ′}.
2.3 Classical Logic extended with strong Negation (N-logic)
The distinction between strong and weak negation was first noticed by Nel-
son [13] in the context of Intuitionistic Logic and later studied by Vakarelov [16]
in the context of Classical Logic. The syntax is obtained from the syntax of Clas-
sical Logic extended with a the connective “¬ ” standing for strong negation,
that is, formulas are built from the set of connectives {∧,∨,←CL, not ,¬}. Note
that here classical negation is dentoed by “not”. We call them the N-formulas.
Accordingly, a N-theory is a set of N-formulas. Evaluation of its connectives,
∧,∨,←CL, not and ¬, is given by the corresponding truth tables in Table 1. In
the sequel, we refer to N-logic if N-formulas or N-theories are considered and
evaluated with respect to these truth tables. Note that N-logic is a conservative
extension of classical logic in the sense that, if we restrict ourselves to formulas
without strong negation (formulas without the ¬ connective), the valid formulas
in N-logic and Classical logic are the same. We use |=CL and ≡CL to denote
entailment and equivalence according to N-logic. Weak negation “not ” can be
defined in terms of “←CL” by the following equivalence:
notϕ ≡CL ⊥ ←CL ϕ (4)
We will consider weak negation here as connective in its own right because of
its importance for logic programming.
It is interesting to note that, every (possibly non-regular) N-formula can be
rewritten as as an equivalent regular N-formula applying the following equiva-
lences taken from Vorob’ev calculus (see Section 2.1 in [14] for more details):
¬¬ϕ ≡CL ϕ (5)
¬notϕ ≡CL ϕ (6)
¬ (ϕ ∧ ψ) ≡CL ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ (7)
¬ (ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡CL ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ (8)
¬ (ϕ←CL ψ) ≡CL ¬ϕ ∧ ψ (9)
For anyN-formula ϕ, we write reg(ϕ) for the regular formula obtained from ϕ by
applying the above equivalences. For a theory Γ , by reg(Γ ) def= { reg(ϕ)
∣∣ ϕ ∈ Γ }
we denote the regular theory obtained in the same way.
2.4 Three-valued  Lukasiewicz Logic ( L-logic)
The syntax of the three-valued  Lukasiewicz logic introduced in [11] is restricted
to the set of connectives {⊥,∧,∨,← L,¬}, that is, by replacing in Classical Logic
connectives “←CL” and “not ” by “← L” and “¬ ”, respectively. We call formulas
build from these connectives  L-formulas. Accordingly, a  L-theory is a set of
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 L-formulas. Evaluation of its connectives, ⊥,∧,∨,← L and ¬, is given by the
corresponding truth tables in Table 1. In the sequel, we refer to the  L-logic,
if  L-formulas or a  L-theory are considered and evaluated with respect to these
truth tables. We use |= L and ≡ L to denote entailment and equivalence according
to  L-logic.
3 Logic Programming
A rule r is an expression of the form:
ϕ← ψ (10)
where ϕ and ψ are implication-free formulas respectively called the head the
body of the rule and L is a literal. Head(r) and Body(r) denote the set of literals
that occur in the head and the body of the rule r, respectively. A rule is basic
(resp. regular) iff its body and head are basic (resp. regular). A normal nested
rule iff is a rule whose head ϕ ∈ (At ∪ ¬At) is a literal, an extended rule is a
normal nested rules such that its body is either ⊤, (this rule is called a positive
fact), or a conjunction of literals or literals preced by weak negation. A normal
rule is an extended nested rules such that its head is a positive literal.
A (logic) program P is a set of rules and, for any program P , by at(P),
we denote the set of all atoms occurring in program P . If it is clear from the
context, then we assume that At = at(P). We also denote by Head(P) = {L |
L ∈ Head(r) and r ∈ P} and Body(P) = {L | L ∈ Body(r) and r ∈ P} the set
of literals occurring in the head and the body of a program P , respectively.
A program is called basic (resp. regular, normal, extended or normal nested)
iff all its rules are basic (resp. regular, normal, extended or normal nested). In
case that ψ = ⊤, we will usually write just ϕ instead of ϕ ← ⊤. We will use
ϕ ↔ ψ as an abbreviation for a pair of rules ϕ ← ψ and ψ ← ϕ. For instance,
the program {a↔ b} is an abbreviation for the program {a← b, b← a}.
3.1 Answer Set Semantics
We review now and extend the definition of Answer Set Semantics from [10] to
possibly non-regular programs. The definition of the Answer Set Semantics to
non-regular programs was first introduced by Pearce [14] using an equilibrium
condition over the models of the logic of here-and-there with strong negation.
The formulation we present here is equivalent, but using classical logic with
strong negation and a reduct instead.
An interpretation I is said to be closed under some regular program P iff
every (ϕ← ψ) ∈ P satisfies that I |=CL ϕ whenever I |=CL ψ holds. The reduct
of a regular formula ϕ with respect to an interpretation I, in symbols ϕI , is
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recursively defined as follows:
ϕI def= ϕ if ϕ is a literal (11)
(ϕ ∧ ψ)I def= ϕI ∧ ψI (12)
(ϕ ∨ ψ)I def= ϕI ∨ ψI (13)
(notϕ)I def=
{
⊥ if I |=CL ϕI
⊤ otherwise
(14)
The reduct of a rule (ϕ ← ψ)I def= ϕI ← ψI is obtained by applying the reduct
to its head and body. The reduct of a logic program is obtained by applying
the reduct to all its rules, that is PI def= { rI
∣∣ r ∈ P }. Furthermore, as
done for N-theories, we also assign to any program P an equivalent regular
program reg(P) def= { reg(r)
∣∣ r ∈ P } with reg(ϕ ← ψ) def= reg(ϕ) ← reg(ψ) for
any rule of the form r = (ϕ← ψ). For any N-formula ϕ, we obtain the regular
formula reg(ϕ) by applying the equivalences (5-8) specified in Section 2.3. Then,
answer sets are defined in terms of the regular counterpart of any program.
Definition 1. Given an interpretation I and a program P, I is an answer set
of P iff I is an ⊆-minimal closed interpretation under reg(P)I .
It is easy to see that, for regular programs, Definition 1 precisely coincide
with the definition of answer set from [10].
It is well-known that every answer set of a logic program without strong
negation is also a model in classical logic of the propositional theory obtained
by replacing the logic programming implication ← by classical implication←CL.
We extend this result to the case of logic programs with strong negation by
replacing classical logic by its extension with strong negation. Formally, given a
logic program P , by N(P) we denote the N-theory resulting of replacing in P
each occurrence of ← by ←CL.
Proposition 1. Given an interpretation I and a program P, I is closed under P
if and only if I is a model of N(P) under N-logic.
Proof. Note that I is closed under P iff all (rules) ϕ ← ψ ∈ P satisfy I |=CL ϕ
whenever I |=CL ψ iff all ϕ ← ψ ∈ P satisfy either I(ϕ) = ⊤ or I(ψ) 6= ⊤ iff all
ϕ← ψ ∈ P satisfy I(ϕ←CL ψ) = ⊤ iff all formulas of the form ϕ←CL ψ ∈ N(P)
satisfy I(ϕ←CL ψ) = ⊤ iff I is a model of N(P) under N-logic.
Corollary 1. Given an interpretation I and a regular program P, I is an answer
set of P if and only if I is a ⊆-minimal model of N(PI) under N-logic.
Proof. From Definition 1 and Proposition 1, it follows that I is an answer set of P
if and only if I is a ⊆-minimal model ofN(PI) under N-logic. Note that, since P
is regular reg(P) = P . Furthermore, we also have N(reg(P ′)) = reg(N(P ′)) ≡CL
N(P ′) for every program P ′. Hence, the statement holds.
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Proposition 2. Given an interpretation I and a regular program P, if I is an
answer set of P, then I is a model of N(P) under N-logic.
Proof (sketch). The proof can be carried out by induction in the structure of the
formula by noting that ϕI is just the result of partially evaluating subformulas
for the form of notψ with respect to I. Hence, from Proposition 1, it follows I
being an answer set of P implies that I is a (⊆-minimal) model of N(reg(P)I).
Take any formula of the form of ϕ←CL ψ in P . Then, the formula reg(ϕ)
I ←CL
reg(ψ)I belongs to N(reg(P)I) and, since I is a model of N(reg(P)I), we get
that I(reg(ϕ)I ←CL reg(ψ)I) = ⊤. This implies that either I(reg(ϕ)I) = ⊤ or
I(reg(ψ)I) 6= ⊤, which in its turn implies that either I(ϕ) = ⊤ or I(ψ) 6= ⊤
holds. Consequently, I(ϕ←CL ψ) = ⊤ and I is a model of N(P).
As may be expected and as the following example shows, the other direction
of Proposition 2 does not hold.
Example 2. 〈∅, ∅〉 = ∅ is the unique answer set of P = {¬p ← q} while its
corresponding N-theory N(P) = {¬p←CL q} has several other models, as for
instance 〈{p}, {q}〉 = {p,¬q}.
It is also well known that normal nested programs without weak nor strong
negation (usually called positive) have a unique answer set which coincides with
the ⊆-minimal classical model (usually called the ⊆-least model) of the corre-
sponding propositional theory (see Proposition 3 in [1]). Similarly, normal nested
programs without weak negation (i.e. basic) have at most one ⊆-minimal model
(and possibly no model) in classical logic with strong negation. For instance, in
the case of {a,¬a} is inconsistent, so it has no ⊆-least model,
Proposition 3. Given any basic normal nested program P, one of the following
two statements holds:3
1. P has a unique answer set which is also the ⊆-least model of N(P), or
2. P has no answer set and N(P) has no model.
Proof. First, note that if N(P) has no model, from Proposition 2, we immedi-
ately get that P has no answer set. Let us show now that if N(P) has a model,
then it has a ⊆-least model. Obviously, since At is finite, if N(P) has a model,
then it has at least some ⊆-minimal model. Suppose, for the sake of contradic-
tion, that N(P) has two different ⊆-minimal models I1 and I2. Then, there are
literals L1 and L2 such that I1(L1) = I2(L2) = ⊤ and I1(L2) = I2(L1) = ⊥. Let
J be an interpretation such that J(L) = I1(L) if I1(L) = I2(L), and J(L) = U,
otherwise. Then, we have that J ⊂ I1 and J ⊂ I2 so J 6|=CL N(P). Hence, there
is a formula in N(P) is of the form L ←CL ϕ with L a literal and ϕ a basic
formula such that J(L) 6= ⊤ and J(ϕ) = ⊤. Furthermore, it can be shown by
induction in the structure of the formula that, for every basic formula ϕ and pair
of interpretations J ⊆ I, we have that J(ϕ) = ⊤ implies I(ϕ) = ⊤. Hence, we
3 Recall, basic programs only consist of rules, whose head and body are implication-
free and have no occurences of weak negation.
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have that I1(ϕ) = ⊤ and I2(ϕ) = ⊤ which, since I1 and I2 are models of N(P),
implies that I1(L) = I2(L) = ⊤. Hence, by construction we have that J(L) = ⊤,
which is a contradiction with the fact that J(L) 6= ⊤. Consequently, there is a
unique ⊆-minimal model I. Finally, note that, since P has no weak negation,
PI = P and, thus, I is also the unique answer set of P .
3.2 Weak Completion Semantics
Formally, given a program P , by  L(P) we denote the  L-theory resulting of
replacing in P each occurrence of ← by ← L. Furthermore, for a normal nested
program P , we say that a literal L is defined in P iff P contains a rule whose
head is L; otherwise we say that L is undefined in P . The set of rules defining a
literal L (those with L in the head) is denoted as def(P , L). The set of all literals
that are undefined in P is denoted by undef(P). We specify the set of defined
literals in P as Head(P) = (At ∪ ¬At) \ undef(P). The set srf(P) of a normal
nested program P , is defined as follows:
srf(P) def= {L← ϕ ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn | L ∈ (At ∪ ¬At) and
def(P , L) = {L← ϕ, . . . , L← ϕn} 6 ∅}.
Below we straightforwardly extend the definition of the weak completion [9] to
normal nested programs, that is, to programs that may contain rules where
the head is a strongly negated literal. The weak completion of a normal nested
program P , denoted wc(P), is defined as follows:
wc(P) def= {L↔ ϕ | (L← ϕ) ∈ srf(P)}
Note that wc(P) is also a normal nested program because we consider that ϕ↔ ψ
in a program is a shorthand for the two rules ϕ← ψ and ψ ← ϕ.
Definition 2. An interpretation I is called wc-model of a normal nested pro-
gram P iff I is a ⊆-minimal model of  L(wc(P)).
Originally WCS was only defined for basic normal programs, extended with
rules of the form A ← ⊥, called (negative) assumption [9]. Here, we will call
these programs, wc-normal programs. Hence, we are only considering programs
with one type of negation, which we will show, corresponds to strong negation in
the ASP. Note that, as opposed to the ASP, the WCS is defined in terms of the
three-valued  Lukasiewicz logic instead of classical logic with strong negation.
[9] showed that wc-normal programs always have a unique wc-model which
can be computed by the following consequence operator [15]:4 Given an interpre-
tation I and a wc-normal program P , the application of Φ to I and P , denoted
by ΦP (I), is an interpretation J = 〈J⊤, J⊥〉 defined as follows:
J⊤ = {A | there is A← Body ∈ P such that I(Body) = ⊤},
J⊥ = {A | there is A← Body ∈ P and
all A← Body ∈ P satisfy I(Body) = ⊥}.
4 The correspondence of this unique wc-model and the well-founded model [17] for
wc-normal programs without positive cycles, has been shown in [4].
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The following example illustrates the WCS by means of two cases of Byrne’s
suppression task from the introduction.
Example 3. Let P1 be the wc-normal program consisting of the rules in (1) in
the introduction.  L(wc(P1)) is the following  L-theory:
ℓ↔ L e ∧ ¬ab1 e↔ L ⊥ ab1 ↔ L ⊥
whose unique wc-model is 〈∅, {e, ℓ, ab1}〉 = {¬e,¬ℓ,¬ab1}. This program illus-
trates why assumptions such as e← ⊥, though being tautologies in  Lukasiewicz
logic, are not tautologies under the WCS: After the the weak completion transfor-
mation they become equivalences, e↔ L ⊥, and, thus, e has to be false. Note that
assumptions can also be overwritten by facts. Let for instance P2 = P1∪{e← ⊤}
be the program obtained by adding the fact e to the above program. Then, its
weak completion  L(wc(P2)) is as follows:
ℓ↔ L e ∧ ¬ab1 e↔ L ⊥ ∨⊤ ab1 ↔ L ⊥
As e ↔ L ⊥ ∨ ⊤ ≡ L e ↔ L ⊤, the unique wc-model of P2 is 〈{e, ℓ}, {ab1}〉 =
{e, ℓ,¬ab1}, where e and ℓ are true. Let P3 be the wc-normal program consisting
of the rules in (2) in the introduction.  L(wc(P3)) is the following  L-theory:
ℓ↔ L (e ∧ ¬ab1) ∨ (t ∧ ¬ab2) e↔ L ⊥ ab1 ↔ L ⊥ ab2 ↔ L ⊥
whose unique wc-model is 〈∅, {e, ab1, ab2}〉 = {¬e,¬ab1,¬ab2}. That is, e, ab1
and ab2 are false, while ℓ and t are unknown.
4 Correspondence between ASP and WCS
Let us first discuss the main differences between both semantics according to
the two examples of the suppression task in the introduction.
Example 4 (Ex. 3 continued). Consider the wc-normal program P1: Its corre-
sponding normal program can be obtained by replacing every assumption of the
form A ← ⊥ in P1 by a fact with strong negation ¬A. The resulting program,
P4 consists of the following rules:
ℓ← e ∧ ¬ab1 ¬e ¬ab1 (15)
Its unique answer set is 〈∅, {e, ab1}〉 = {¬e,¬ab1}, which does not coincide with
the wc-model of P1, as ℓ is false under the WCS, but unknown under the ASP.
The above example illustrates that replacing assumptions by strong negation
facts is not enough to obtain the same results between WCS and ASP.
As mentioned previously the ASP and WCS can be respectively defined
in terms of classical logic with strong negation and three-valued  Lukasiewicz
logic. Interestingly, Vakarelov [16] showed that there is a correspondence between
 L-logic and N-logic, in the sense that all connectives of one logic are definable
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in terms of the other one. In particular, here we are interested in translating
from the WCS to the ASP and, thus, that implies a translation from  L-logic to
N-logic. Formally, given a  L-theory Γ , by N˜(Γ ) we denote the result of replacing
in Γ every occurrence of ϕ← L ψ by (ϕ←CL ψ) ∧ (¬ψ ←CL ¬ϕ).
Theorem 1 (Theorem 11 in [16]). Given any  L-theory Γ , an interpretation I
is a model of Γ under  L-logic iff I is a model of N(Γ ) under N-logic.
Based on this result, we can establish the correspondence between the ASP
and the WCS.
We need rules that negatively complete the information of the given program.
Let us now formalize this idea by defining the definition completion of a program.
Definition 3. Given a normal nested program P, its definition completion is
defined as follows:
P˜ def= P ∪ {¬L← ¬ϕ | (L← ϕ) ∈ srf(P)} (16)
Let us apply the suggested characterization for the programs in Example 4.
Example 5 (Ex. 4 continued). Given P4, its definition completion is as follows:
P˜4 = P4 ∪ { ¬ℓ←¬ (e ∧ ¬ab1), ¬¬e←¬⊤, ¬¬ab1←¬⊤ }
Note that ¬ℓ← (¬ e ∧ ¬ab1) is equivalent to ¬ℓ← ¬e ∨ ab1, while the last two
rules are tautologies under the ASP. The unique answer set of P˜4 corresponds
to the unique wc-model of P1.
4.1 Characterization of WCS in Terms of ASP
We will now introduce some auxiliary results that will help us to show the corre-
spondence between WCS and ASP. Let us start by showing that the answer sets
of any program coincide with the answer sets of its weak completion. The proof
of this statement relies on the the following lemma which is a straightforward
lifting of the Completion Lemma from [6, p. 23] to the class of programs with
strong negation.
Lemma 1. Let P be any program, let At be any set of atoms (not necessar-
ily equal to at(P)) and let Q ⊆ (At ∪ ¬At) be any set of literals such that Q ∩
Head(P) = ∅. Let ϕL be some implication-free formula for each literal L ∈ Q
and I be an interpretation. Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
1. I is an answer set of P ∪ { L← ϕL
∣∣ L ∈ Q }.
2. I is an answer set of P ∪ { L↔ ϕL
∣∣ L ∈ Q }.
Proposition 4. Given any normal nested program P, an interpretation I is an
answer set of P if and only if I is an answer set of wc(P).
12 Emmanuelle-Anna Dietz Saldanha1 and Jorge Fandinno2
Proof. Assume that P is regular. From item (ii) of Proposition 6 in [10], P and
srf(P) have the same answer sets. Note that there is a unique rule with head L
for each literal L ∈ (At ∪ ¬At) in srf(P). Hence, wc(P) is obtained by replacing
all occurrences of ← in srf(P) by ↔ and, from Lemma 1 (by taking P = ∅),
srf(P) and wc(P) have the same answer sets. In case that P is not regular, we
have that I is an answer set of P iff I is an answer set of reg(P) iff I is an answer
set of wc(reg(P)) = reg(wc(P)) iff I is an answer set of wc(P).
Lemma 2. Given any normal nested logic program P, an interpretation I is a
model of N(wc(P˜)) under N-logic if and only if I is a model of  L(wc(P)).
Proof. Note that N(wc(P˜)) has a pair of equivalences of the form
A↔CL ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn (17)
¬A↔CL ¬ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬ϕn (18)
for each A ∈ At with def(P , L) = {A← ϕ1, . . . , A← ϕn} 6= ∅. On the other
hand, we have that  L(wc(P)) has an equivalences of the form
A↔ L ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn (19)
for each atom A ∈ At with def(P , L) = {A← ϕ1, . . . , A← ϕn} 6= ∅. By Theo-
rem 1, the models of  L(wc(P)) under  L-logic and the models of N( L(wc(P)))
under N-logic coincide. Note now that, by definition, we have that (19) is equiv-
alent to the following formula
(A← L ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn) ∧ (ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn ← L A) (20)
Hence, N( L(wc(P))) contains a formula of the form ψA
1
∧ψA
2
∧ψA
3
∧ψA
4
for each
atom A ∈ At with def(P , A) = {A← ϕ1, . . . , A← ϕn} 6= ∅ where
ψA
1
def=A←CL ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn (21)
ψA
2
def=¬A←CL ¬(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn) (22)
ψA
3
def=ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn ←CL A (23)
ψA4
def=¬(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn)←CL ¬A (24)
Note that, by definition, ψA1 ∧ ψ
A
3 is equivalent to (17). Besides ψ
A
3 ∧ ψ
A
4 can be
equivalently rewritten as
¬A↔CL ¬ (ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn) (25)
that is equivalent to (18), i.e.  L(wc(P)) andN(wc(P˜)) have the same models.
Proposition 5. Given any normal nested program P and interpretation I, if I
is an answer set of P˜, then I is a model of  L(wc(P)).
Proof. From Lemma 2, I is a model of N(wc(P˜)) iff I is a model of  L(wc(P)).
From Proposition 4, the answer sets of P˜ and wc(P˜) are the same. Furthermore,
from Proposition 2, the answer sets of wc(P˜) are models of N(wc(P˜)) under
N-logic. Hence, the answer sets of P˜ are wc-models of P .
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Given Lemma 2, Proposition 3,4 and 5, we can now show how the definition
completion of a program precisely characterizes the WCS in terms of the ASP.
Theorem 2. Given any wc-normal program P and interpretation I, the follow-
ing two statements are equivalent:
1. I is the unique wc-model of P,
2. I is the unique answer set of P˜.
The following two statements are also equivalent:
1. P has no wc-model,
2. P˜ has no answer set.
Proof. Assume that N(wc(P˜)) has no model. From Lemma 2, it follows that
 L(wc(P)) has no model either and, thus, there is no wc-model of P . Besides,
from Proposition 5, the lack of model of  L(wc(P)) also implies that P˜ has no
answer set. Otherwise,N(wc(P˜)) has a model and, since is a wc-normal program
and thus basic, from Proposition 3, we get that there is an interpretation I which
the ⊆-least model of N(wc(P˜)) and, thus, the unique answer set of wc(P˜). From
Proposition 4 this implies that I is the unique answer set of P˜ . Furthermore,
from Lemma 2, this also implies that it is the ⊆-least model of  L(wc(P)) and,
thus, the unique wc-model of P .
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We have shown how logic programs under the Weak Completion Semantics can
be translated into logic programs under the Answer Set Semantics by using the
definition completion. This completion adds rules supporting the strong negation
of a defined atom whenever all the bodies of all rules defining it are false. This
transformation has been illustrated by two examples of Byrne’s suppression task.
This result allows us to use all the knowledge representation features of An-
swer Set Programming, including default negation, in combination with this com-
pletion and opens two interesting future possibilities: On the one hand, in [5],
logic programs under the Weak Completion Semantics were extended with a
context operator to capture negation as failure. Hence, an immediate question
is whether these contextual logic programs can also be translated into logic pro-
grams under the Answer Set Semantics by using default negation. On the other
hand, it would be interesting to investigate how the twelve cases of the sup-
pression task could be represented by means of default negation or the context
operator in order to ensure elaboration tolerance [12].
Another interesting observation is that the proof of the correspondence be-
tween these two semantics relies on the use of strong negation as a connective
in its own right, as opposed to the usual convention of considering that strong
negation can only be applied to atoms. This extension was first considered by
David Pearce in [14]. It would be worth to investigate how the usual properties
of the Answer Set Semantics can be extended to this class of programs and how
its use can ease other knowledge representation problems.
14 Emmanuelle-Anna Dietz Saldanha1 and Jorge Fandinno2
Acknowledgements. We are thankful to David Pearce for pointing to Vakarelov’s
work on the relation between  Lukasiewicz logic and classical logic with strong
negation.
References
1. Baral, C.: Knowledge Representation, Reasoning, and Declarative Problem Solv-
ing. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA (2003)
2. Byrne, R.M.J.: Suppressing valid inferences with conditionals. Cognition 31, 61–83
(1989)
3. Dietz, E.A., Ho¨lldobler, S., Ragni, M.: A computational logic approach to the
suppression task. In: Miyake, N., Peebles, D., Cooper, R.P. (eds.) Proc. of the 34th
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci 2012. pp. 1500–1505.
Cognitive Science Society (2012)
4. Dietz, E.A., Ho¨lldobler, S., Wernhard, C.: Modeling the suppression task under
weak completion and well-founded semantics. Journal of Applied Non-Classsical
Logics 24(1–2), 61–85 (2014)
5. Dietz Saldanha, E.A., Ho¨lldobler, S., Pereira, L.M.: Contextual reasoning: Usu-
ally birds can abductively fly. In: Proceedings of 14th International Conference on
Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning (LPNMR). pp. 64–77. Springer
International Publishing (2017)
6. Ferraris, P., Lifschitz, V.: Weight constraints as nested expressions. TPLP 5(1-2),
45–74 (2005), https://doi.org/10.1017/S1471068403001923
7. Gelfond, M., Lifschitz, V.: Classical negation in logic programs and disjunctive
databases. New Generation Computing 9(3), 365–385 (Aug 1991)
8. Ho¨lldobler, S.: Weak completion semantics and its applications in human reasoning.
In: Furbach, U., Schon, C. (eds.) Proc. of the Workshop on Bridging the Gap
between Human and Automated Reasoning. CEUR Workshop Proc., vol. 1412,
pp. 2–16. CEUR-WS.org (2015)
9. Ho¨lldobler, S., Kencana Ramli, C.D.: Logic programs under three-valued
 Lukasiewicz semantics. In: Hill, P.M., Warren, D.S. (eds.) 25th int. Conference
on Logic Programming. LNCS, vol. 5649, pp. 464–478. Springer (2009)
10. Lifschitz, V., Tang, L.R., Turner, H.: Nested expressions in logic
programs. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 25(3-4), 369–389 (1999),
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018978005636
11.  Lukasiewicz, J.: O logice tro´jwartos´ciowej. Ruch Filozoficzny 5, 169–171 (1920)
12. McCarthy, J.: Elaboration tolerance. In: Common Sense. vol. 98. Citeseer (1998)
13. Nelson, D.: Constructible falsity. Journal of Symbolic Logic 14(1), 16–26 (03 1949)
14. Pearce, D.: A new logical characterisation of stable models and answer sets. In: Dix,
J., Pereira, L.M., Przymusinski, T.C. (eds.) Non-Monotonic Extensions of Logic
Programming. pp. 57–70. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg (1997)
15. Stenning, K., van Lambalgen, M.: Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science. A
Bradford Book, MIT Press (2008)
16. Vakarelov, D.: Notes on n-lattices and constructive logic with strong negation.
Studia logica 36(1-2), 109–125 (1977)
17. Van Gelder, A., Ross, K.A., Schlipf, J.S.: The well-founded semantics for general
logic programs. Journal of the ACM 38(3), 619–649 (1991)
